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Abstract 
Between 2000 and 2006, the Gini coefficient declined in 12 of the 17 Latin American 
countries for which data are available. Why has inequality declined? Have the changes 
in inequality been driven by market forces such as the demand and supply for labor 
with different skills? Or have governments become more redistributive than they used 
to be, and if so, why? This paper attempts to answer these questions by focusing on 
the determinants of inequality in four countries: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Peru. 
The  analysis  suggests  that  the  decline  in  inequality  is  accounted  for  by  two  main 
factors: (i) a fall in the earnings gap between skilled and low-skilled workers (through 
both  quantity  and  price  effects);  and  (ii)  more  progressive  government  transfers 
(monetary  and  in-kind  transfers).  Demographic  factors,  such  as  a  change  in  the 
proportion of adults (and working adults) per household, have been equalizing but the 
magnitude of their contribution has been small by comparison. In Brazil, Mexico and 
Peru, the fall in earnings gap, in turn, is mainly the result of the expansion of basic 
education over the last couple of decades, which reduced inequality in attainment and 
made the returns to education curve less steep. It also results from the petering out of 
the unequalizing effect of skill-biased technical change in the 1990s associated with the 
opening up of trade and investment. In Argentina, the decline in earnings inequality 
seems to be associated with government policies that without the windfall of high 
commodity prices will be hard to sustain. 
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Introduction  
 
Inequality is a distinctive feature of the Latin American region, both due to its high level and 
persistence. However, after a period of rising inequality in the 1990s, income inequality in 
the region has been on the decline since the late-1990s and early 2000s (Figure 1). Of the 17 
countries for which comparable data are available, 12 experienced a decline in their Gini 
coefficient between (circa) 2000 and 2006 (Figure 2). The pace of the decline ranges from –
3.1 percent a year for Ecuador to –0.2 percent a year for Venezuela; the average decline for 
the 12 countries is –1.1 percent a year. All the declines except for Venezuela’s are 
statistically significant.
 3 
The decline in inequality has been widespread. Inequality has fallen in both high 
inequality countries (Brazil) and low inequality countries
4 (Argentina); fast growing countries 
(Chile and Peru), slow growing countries (Brazil and Mexico), and countries recovering from 
crisis (Argentina); countries with a large indigenous population (Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru) 
and countries with a low indigenous population (Argentina); in countries governed by the left 
(Brazil and Chile) and in countries governed by non-leftist regimes (Mexico and Peru); in 
countries with a universalistic social policy (Argentina and Chile) and in countries with a 
traditionally exclusionary state (Bolivia and El Salvador). This widespread decline in 
inequality is remarkable for a region that has witnessed high, persistent levels of inequality. 
To a large extent, inequality in Latin America is the result of state-capture on the part of 
predatory elites, capital market imperfections, inequality of opportunities (in particular, in 
terms of access to good quality education), labor market segmentation, and discrimination 
against women and non-whites
5. Hence, the observed fall in inequality is good news both for 
fairness and for growth.  
  Why has inequality declined in Latin America? Have the changes in inequality been 
driven by market forces such as the demand and supply for labor with different skills? Or 
have governments become more redistributive than they used to be? In particular, are the 
changes in inequality driven by changes in the distribution of personal characteristics (in 
particular, in the distribution of educational attainment) or in the returns to those personal 
characteristics (the steepness in the returns to education, for example)? What caused them to 
change in turn? Was it increased coverage of basic education, the skill-mix of technological 
                                                 
3. Using the bootstrap method, the changes were found to be significant at a 95 percent level and with 100 
replications. 
4 By “low” we mean low by Latin American standards. 
5. See, for example, Atal et al. (2009); Barros et al. (2009); Levy and Walton (2009); De Ferranti et al. (2004).    3
change, macroeconomic conditions or stronger labor unions?  Do changes in the coverage 
and distribution of government transfers account for a significant part of the decline in 
income inequality? What has been the role of socio-demographic factors such as changes in 
dependency ratios and labor force participation rates for women?  
This paper attempts to answer these questions by focusing on the determinants of 
changes in income inequality in four countries: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Peru.
6 The 
analysis is based on a variety of parametric and non-parametric methods to decompose the 
changes in household income inequality in its proximate factors. This empirical analysis is 
combined with indirect evidence and historical narratives to delve into the more fundamental 
determinants of inequality. 
The analysis suggests that the decline in inequality is accounted for by two main 
factors: (i) a fall in the earnings gap between skilled and low-skilled workers (through both 
quantity and price effects); and (ii) more progressive government transfers (monetary and in-
kind transfers). Demographic factors, such as a change in the proportion of adults (and 
working adults) per household, have been equalizing but the magnitude of their contribution 
has been, in general, relatively smaller. In Brazil, Mexico and Peru, the fall in earnings gap, 
in turn, is mainly the result of the expansion of basic education over the last couple of 
decades, which reduced inequality in attainment and made the returns to education curve less 
steep. It also results from the petering out of the unequalizing effect of skill-biased technical 
change in the 1990s associated with the opening up of trade and investment. In the case of 
Argentina, the decline in inequality seems to be driven by a pro-union stance on the part of 
the government and redistributive fiscal policy based on the windfall of high commodity 
prices.   
The upgrading of skills among the poor, however, will eventually face barriers in 
access to tertiary education– mainly due to the low quality education they receive in previous 
levels – at which point the decline in inequality is unlikely to continue. In addition, despite 
the undeniable progress in making public policy more pro-poor, a large share of government 
spending is neutral or regressive in the distributive sense and the collection of personal 
income and wealth taxes is relatively low. In order to continue on the path towards more 
equitable societies, it is crucial that public spending is made more progressive and efforts are 
redoubled to improve access to quality services (education, in particular) for the poor. 
                                                 
6 The paper is a synthesis of the country studies prepared for the UNDP-sponsored project Markets, the State 
and the dynamics of inequality in Latin America coordinated by Luis Felipe Lopez-Calva and Nora Lustig.   4
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the trends in inequality and its 
proximate determinants in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Peru. Section 2 includes detailed 
country narratives that delve into the more fundamental determinants of inequality changes. 
Section 3 summarizes the main findings.  Section 4 presents concluding remarks.  
1.  Characterizing the recent decline in inequality and its proximate 
determinants in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Peru 
 
The four countries analyzed in this paper can be considered a representative sample (not 
in the statistical sense, but in terms of their characteristics) of middle-income countries in 
Latin America. It includes countries that experienced relatively high growth rates (Argentina 
and Peru) and countries where growth was modest (Brazil and Mexico)
 7; one of the most 
unequal countries in Latin America (Brazil) (Figure 3); a traditionally low-inequality country, 
which witnessed the largest increase in inequality in the region over the past three decades 
(Argentina); three of the largest countries, in terms of population and GDP (Argentina, Brazil 
and Mexico); two countries where innovative, large-scale conditional cash transfers have 
been implemented (Brazil and Mexico); one of the countries with a large indigenous 
population (Peru)
8; one country with a universalistic social policy (Argentina) and two 
countries with a dualistic social policy (Brazil and Mexico); and, finally, one country 
governed by the populist left (Argentina), one country governed by the social democratic left 
(Brazil), and two countries governed by non-leftist regimes (Mexico and Peru). In spite of 
such heterogeneity, we will see how these four countries share some common features in 
terms of what factors determined the decline in inequality. 
Table 1 presents the evolution of the four countries’ Gini coefficients and the main 
economic and socio-demographic characteristics for (circa) 2000–2006. Income inequality, as 
measured by the Gini coefficient, fell by 4 percentage points in Brazil (2001–2006), 3.7 
percentage points in Mexico (2000–2006), 3.1 percentage points in Peru (2001–2006) and 2.2 
percentage points in (urban) Argentina.
9 In all four countries, the decline was statistically 
significant, there was Lorenz dominance and results are broadly robust with respect to the 
                                                 
7. Argentina and Peru enjoyed high GDP per capita growth rates between 2003 and 2006: 7.8 and 5.2 percent a 
year, respectively. In contrast, in Brazil and Mexico GDP per capita growth was modest, at 2.7 and 2.8 percent a 
year, respectively. The GDP data is from World Development Indicators (WDI) database, World Bank, January 
2009. The GDP per capita growth (annual %) was calculated based on the GDP per capita at purchasing power 
parity (PPP) prices (constant 2005 international dollars).  
8. Based on Maldonado and Rios (2006), in 2001 around 37 percent of Peru’s population was indigenous.  
9. The declines are statistically significant at the 95 percent level of significance. According to Gasparini and 
Cruces (2009), trends in urban Argentina are representative of changes for the country as a whole.   5
choice of income variable (monetary or total income, for example) and inequality measure 
(entropy measures, for example). It is interesting to note that the four countries share two 
relevant socio-demographic changes. First, the proportion of working adults as a share of the 
total number of adults (and total household members) rose in the four countries. This must be 
linked to the sharp increase in female labor force participation, which rose between 1990 and 
2006 by 18.1 percentage points in Mexico, 14.2 in Argentina, 12.0 in Brazil and 5.8 
percentage points in Peru.
10 Second, average years of schooling rose faster for the bottom 
quintile than for the top quintile. In Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, the difference in growth 
rates in years of schooling led to a narrowing of the difference in average years of schooling 
between the two quintiles in absolute terms; Mexico showed the fastest decline of this gap. 
Below we shall explore the importance of these changes for the dynamics of inequality. 
Growth incidence curves (GIC) for population deciles and percentiles reveal some 
interesting patterns (Figure 4). In all four countries, the growth rate of income of the groups 
at the bottom was higher than the average of the growth rates of all deciles or percentiles. The 
income of the bottom decile in all four countries, for example, rose at between 14 and 66 
percent between (roughly) 2000 and 2006. Almost perfect examples of “pro-poor” growth 
can be found in Mexico and Peru, with a negative slope of their respective GICs throughout. 
But, in Argentina and Brazil the bottom decile did not experience the largest increase; 
furthermore, there is evidence that if you break the 2001–2007 period in Brazil in two, during 
the period 2004–2007 the income of the bottom 5 percent fell, revealing a disturbing pattern 
in otherwise pro-poor growth
11. In Argentina, income declined for the top 5 percent. In the 
other three, it rose at below 5 percent.  Hence, top incomes did not do well during the 2000s. 
This last result, however, has to be taken with caution because household surveys do not 
capture incomes—non-wage incomes in particular-- accurately at the top.
12  
The decline in income inequality in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Peru has been 
significant, both statistically and in order of magnitude.  Why did inequality decline in these 
four countries? There are many different factors that affect the distribution of income over 
time. The existing evidence suggests that “… the evolution of the distribution of income is 
the  result  of  many  different  effects—some  of  them  quite  large—which  may  offset  one 
another in whole or in part.”
13 A useful way to think about the determinants of inequality is to 
                                                 
10 ECLAC (2007). 
11 Barros et al. (forthcoming). 
12 That can be due to limitations in the representativeness of the sample at the top or non-sampling errors such as 
under-reporting of incomes at the top, particularly non-wage income. 
13. Bourguignon, Ferreira & Lustig (2005), pp. 12.   6
consider the factors that affect the distribution of income at the individual and household 
level.  
 Factors that cause the distribution of income to change can be broadly classified into 
four categories: i. changes in the underlying distribution of physical and financial assets, 
personal characteristics (that is, the racial, ethnic, age, gender, health and educational make 
up  of  the  population)  and  population’s  location  (rural  or  urban  areas,  for  example);  ii. 
changes in the returns to assets, personal characteristics (in particular, the return to human 
capital) and location; iii. changes in how people use assets (for example, utilization of arable 
land) and participate in the labor market (for example, active/inactive, self-employment/wage 
labor and hours worked); iv. changes in transfers, both private (e.g., remittances) and public 
(e.g., cash transfers or in-kind transfers). At the household level, changes in the distribution 
of  income  will  be  affected  by:  i.  changes  in  marriage/couple  formation  patterns  (e.g., 
assortative matching, single parenthood); ii. changes in consumption patterns; iii. changes in 
fertility rates, and iv. changes in life expectancy. The last two affect the dependency ratio.  
State action can modify the distribution of income through two main channels: (1) 
directly, through fiscal or budgetary interventions (taxes and transfers) that change disposable 
income and purchasing power (including indirect taxes and subsidies)
14, and (2) indirectly, 
through interventions that affect the determinants of market or primary income.  Indirect 
interventions, in turn, can be of two types. Measures that affect economic power and access 
to assets, through—for example-- transfers (or redistribution) of productive assets (including 
investments in human capital and land reform) and policies affecting the use of, and returns 
to, these assets (this includes non-budgetary regulatory interventions, as for example, price 
controls, minimum wage policies, import or export restrictions, labor market regulations, and 
anti-trust legislation and competitiveness policies). And, second, government actions that 
change the distribution of voice and power among different groups in society. Government 
actions through direct and indirect interventions can affect the level and distribution of assets, 
returns to those assets, and post-fiscal (after taxes and transfers) incomes.  
Which of these factors (and to what extent) were behind the observed decline in 
inequality in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Peru? We try to answer such a complex question 
with detailed country narratives that integrate econometric analysis and quantitative 
decomposition exercises with historical and indirect evidence.  As we shall see, this rather 
                                                 
14. Fiscal interventions also include general and targeted indirect subsidies and indirect taxes that affect the 
purchasing power of disposable income.   7
thorough approach allows us to delve into the more fundamental determinants of the 
observed changes in income inequality. Before we turn to the country narratives, we shall 
assess the relative importance of proximate factors in accounting for the changes in the 
distribution of income in our four countries.  
Per capita household income can be written as ( ) o w u a y + = . . . This identity relates 
changes in per capita household income, y, to its four proximate determinants: (i) changes in 
the proportion of adults in the household, a; (ii) changes in the proportion of working adults, 
u; and (iii) changes in labor income per working adult in the household, w; and (iv) changes 
in household non-labor income per adult, o.
15 (Figure 5) Alejo et al. (2009) apply a non-
parametric method proposed by Barros et al. (2006) to decompose the change in inequality in 
these four proximate determinants for the period 2000-2006. The method consists of 
decomposing the change in any inequality measure into the contributions from changes in the 
distribution of the proximate determinants, taken one at a time, plus the contributions from 
changes in the interaction (correlation) of proximate determinants with each other. The 
contributions are estimated through a series of sequential counterfactual simulations, which 
assume that the distribution of the proximate determinant of interest remains the same as in 
the base year
16.  
The results are summarized in Table 2. In the four countries, changes in the ratio of 
adults were equalizing, albeit the orders of magnitude were smaller by comparison to other 
factors. With the exception of Peru, changes in labor force participation (the proportion of 
working adults) were equalizing.  This effect was stronger in Argentina. Again with the 
exception of Peru, changes in the distribution of labor income were equalizing too. In all four 
countries, changes in the distribution of non-labor income were equalizing.  From this 
straightforward decomposition, we learned that—at the household level—the changes in the 
distribution of non-labor income were equalizing and in the cases of Peru and Brazil, the 
contribution of this factor was quite high. However, non-labor income is composed of a wide 
range of very heterogeneous sources: in particular, returns to capital (rents, interests, 
dividends, etc.), pensions and private (remittances, for example) and public (conditional cash 
transfers, for example) transfers.  So looking at this factor in the aggregate does not tell us 
much.  
                                                 
15 For a detailed description of the methodology see Barros et al. (2006). 
16. Note that although this method can be applied using any inequality indicator, the results will vary depending 
on the indicator. Also, the results will be sensitive to which year is chosen as the base year and the sequence 
selected to construct the counterfactual simulations.    8
Each proximate determinant, in turn, is the result of myriad of behavioral and external 
processes. For example, the first proximate determinant—changes in the proportion of adults 
in the household-- captures the impact of changes in fertility and life expectancy. The second 
is influenced by decisions to participate in the labor force and the demand for labor. The third 
and fourth – labor earnings per working adult and household non-labor income per adult– are 
determined by many factors: for example, market forces and state action affecting the 
demand for labor by characteristics (education, experience, gender, sector, formal/informal); 
decisions by individuals (and their parents) to invest in education and other forms of capital, 
to participate in the labor market and how (wage earner or self-employed, full time or part 
time), to migrate and to send remittances, and government transfers. In addition, the 
proximate determinants at the household level are affected by assortative matching.  It could 
be the case, for example, that changes in the distribution of labor income are unequalizing 
(equalizing) at the household level but not for individual workers.  These issues are analyzed 
in the country narratives that follow. 
2.  The recent decline in inequality and its fundamental determinants in 
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Peru
17 
 
The decomposition exercise reveals that--in different degrees depending on the 
country--changes in the distribution of labor (with the exception of Peru) and non-labor 
income account for a significant share of the decline in overall inequality.  In this section we 
will explore which factors are behind these results. Are the changes in labor income 
inequality driven by changes in the distribution of personal characteristics (in particular, in 
the distribution of educational attainment) or in the returns to those personal characteristics 
(returns to education, for example)? What caused them to change in turn? Was it increased 
coverage of basic education, the skill-mix of technological change, macroeconomic 
conditions or stronger labor unions? Do patterns at the household level differ from patterns at 
the individual workers level? Do changes in the coverage and distribution of government 
transfers account for a significant part of the decline in non-labor income inequality? Are 
remittances an equalizing force in the countries were they are important?  
                                                 
17 This section is based on Gasparini and Cruces (2009) for Argentina, Barros et al. (2009) for Brazil, Esquivel, 
Lustig and Scott (2009) for Mexico, and Jaramillo and Saavedra (2009) for Peru.  These papers were prepared 
for the UNDP-sponsored project mentioned above.   9
Argentina  
Gasparini and Cruces (2009) show how Argentina, a country well known for its large and 
educated middle class in the 1960s, has experienced a sharp increase in income inequality 
between 1960 and the end of the 1990s. Argentina moved from a ‘European’ income 
distribution towards a ‘Latin American’ level of inequality in thirty years. The Gini 
coefficient for the distribution of household per capita income in the Greater Buenos Aires 
(GBA) area, for example, soared from 0.344 in 1974 to 0.487 in 2006
18. The results are 
significant and robust to several definitions of income. 
The authors carry out an episodic analysis of inequality the mid-1970s and the mid-2000s 
(Figure 6). Most of the analysis focuses on the evolution of inequality between the early 
1990s and mid-2000s. This period was characterized by a sharp increase in inequality from 
1990 until the beginning of 2000, and a decline in inequality in the aftermath of the 2001/02 
macroeconomic crisis. It covers two very different, almost opposite, economic policy 
regimes. In the 1990s, Argentina went through far reaching market-oriented reforms in a 
context of weak labor market institutions and limited social protection. In the 2000s, state 
intervention in the economy became more pervasive, labor market institutions were stronger 
and social protection schemes redistributed income to unskilled and semi-skilled workers.  
Here, we will focus on the analysis of the latest period, in which inequality declined. 
As mentioned above, following the 2002 crisis and after experiencing a sharp increase, 
income inequality fell: the Gini coefficient for primary incomes fell from 0.554 in 2002 to 
0.493 in 2006. This period was characterized by unprecedentedly high GDP growth of 8 
percent a year between 2003 and 2007 and a sharp fall in the unemployment rate from more 
than 20 percent to 8 percent. However, it should be noted that although inequality fell 
substantially in relation to the crisis levels, it was not significantly different from its mid/late-
1990s levels despite the fact that per capita GDP and employment were higher, labor 
institutions were stronger, and a massive cash transfer program was implemented. 
Based on the results presented in Table 2, we can see that labor market related factors 
(the decline in inequality in labor income per working adult and the change in the ratio of 
working adults per total adults in the household) accounted for sixty percent of the observed 
decline in inequality. Gasparini and Cruces (2009) argue that the fall in inequality could be 
accounted for by the employment generated by the recovery; the shift in favor of more low-
                                                 
18. These figures are derived from Argentina’s main official household survey (Encuesta Permanente de 
Hogares, EPH), which covers the main urban areas of the country. The EPH started in the 1970s as a survey for 
GBA, which accounts for one third of Argentina’s population, and was gradually extended later to cover all 
urban areas with more than 100,000 inhabitants, which represent two thirds of the total.    10
skilled, labor-intensive sectors as a result of the devaluation and the recovery in real wages 
that followed its overshooting; the rise in the influence of labor unions; and, the fading of the 
one-time effect of skill-biased technical change that occurred in the 1990s.  
The evidence shows that macroeconomic crises in Argentina have been unequalizing. The 
distribution of primary income worsened quite substantially during the crises. With the 
exception of the years following the 1995 crisis, however, the effect on inequality tended to 
be reversed in the post-crisis years. Given the significant reduction in unemployment, it 
seems safe to presume that the fast recovery of the Argentine economy was a contributing 
factor to the decline in inequality. In addition, during the 1995 crisis, social spending as a 
share of total disposable income fell and became less progressive. In contrast, while total 
social spending as a proportion of disposable income also fell in the 2002 crisis, it became 
more progressive as the programs targeted at the poor (for example, Jefes y Jefas de Hogar 
Desocupados) were expanded.  
Interestingly, the large devaluation of the peso in 2002 had an indirect equalizing impact 
in terms of post-fiscal income inequality. The devaluation had a negative impact on real 
wages and a positive effect on rents to land which was compounded by the substantial 
improvement in terms of trade resulting from the global commodity boom. However, the 
negative (and unequalizing) effect on real wages was in part compensated by the expansion 
of progressive export taxes which were used to finance large anti-poverty programs. In 
addition, the excise duties (or “retenciones”) had an indirect redistributive impact because 
they kept domestic prices of traded goods below their international level; this was particularly 
important for food.  
The Argentine labor market has been characterized by the presence of strong, 
industry-wide unions, which played a significant role in shaping the country’s social, 
economic and political outlook, mainly through their relation with the Peronist party. There is 
evidence that Union membership and activity diminished significantly from 1991 to 2001. 
The decline in union activity coincides with reforms such as the privatizations, trade 
liberalization and price stabilization of the 1990s, which reduced the power of unions through 
the dissipation of rents from state-owned enterprises, protective tariffs and inflation-induced 
rents. The decline in union activity during the 1990s coincided with a period of rising wage 
inequality. The revival of union activism, in contrast, coincided with a period of falling wage 
inequality after 2002.  Since 2002, the government raised the minimum wage, mandated 
lumpsum increases in wages and promoted collective bargaining.  Through export taxes and 
subsidies, prices of foodstuff and fuels were kept below their market levels.  Although the   11
benefits of these policies leak to the non-poor and create all sorts of inefficiencies, they are 
equalizing in the short-term.   
The authors found that during the 1990s a large factor behind the increase in 
inequality was the increase in the steepness of returns to education: that is, the labor earnings 
gap between skilled and low-skilled workers rose.  As in other Latin American countries, the 
increase in the skill premium was associated with the modernization of production and 
organizational structures.  This skill-biased technical change, in turn, was associated with 
Argentina’s trade and investment liberalization.  By early 2000s, however, the large-scale 
technological upgrading was probably coming to an end. Hence, the upward pressure on 
wages for skilled labor—an unequalizing force-- must have subsided.   
Gasparini and Cruces also present estimates of the redistributive impact of 
government transfers in cash and in kind. The estimates include programs and spending 
categories financed by general government revenues (as opposed to specific contributions, as 
in the cases of pensions and health insurance); these include education, health, water, 
sanitation, poverty alleviation programs, housing, employment policies, and most municipal 
services. They also include estimates of the redistributive impact of (federal and state) taxes. 
The results show that the incidence of social spending is mildly progressive (i.e., the post-
transfers distribution is more equal) and taxes are somewhat regressive (i.e., the post-taxes 
distribution is less equal).  
Since 2000, state action through fiscal interventions became more progressive. 
Primarily as a result of export levies, taxes became more progressive.  Higher fiscal revenues 
were used to increase social spending. Social spending also became more progressive with 
the implementation of large cash transfer programs such as Jefes y Jefas de Hogar 
Desocupados in 2002 (which reached 2 million households in 2003). The latter may be an 
important factor behind the equalizing contribution of the changes in the distribution of non-
labor income. 
In sum, the fundamental determinants of the recent decline in inequality in Argentina 
seem to be mainly associated with political economy factors: a pro-union government that is 
actively redistributing the windfall from very favorable terms of trade. The sustainability of 
this policy, however, is doubtful precisely because the expansion of government spending is 
based on revenues that are subject to volatility.  The impact of the global financial crisis on 
commodity prices, exports and capital flows will provide an opportunity to explore this 
question empirically.   12
Brazil 
Brazil is known as having one of the highest levels of income inequality in the world. 
There were years when Brazil’s Gini coefficient was equal to 0.63, almost a historical and 
worldwide record. After a few years with very little change, the Gini coefficient has been 
falling steadily since 1998. The steepest decline occurred between 2000 and 2007 when 
Brazil’s Gini coefficient declined 4.1 percentage points from 0.593 to 0.552, about 1.3 
percent per year
19 (Figure 7). Extreme poverty and moderate poverty also fell between 2001 
and 2007 despite the fact that average income growth during the period was modest – of the 
order of 2.5 percent per year. 
  Thus, based on the observed trends in poverty and inequality and the GIC’s presented 
above, Brazil’s growth pattern could be defined as ‘pro-poor’ (i.e. the growth of the income 
of the poor has been higher than the growth of the income of the rich). From 2001 to 2007, 
the per capita income of the poorest 10 percent grew 7 percent per year, a rate of growth 
nearly three times the national average (2.5 percent), while that of the richest 10 percent grew 
only 1.1 percent. Two thirds of the decline in extreme poverty can be attributed to the 
reduction in inequality. For the same reduction in extreme poverty to be reached through 
growth, Brazil’s overall per capita income would have needed to grow an extra 4 percentage 
points per year.  
 Barros, et al. (2009) estimate the role played by public policy and the performance of 
markets in the evolution of income inequality. In particular, the authors focus on four 
dimensions: (i) changes in wage differentials by skill level; (ii) changes in labor market 
segmentation; (iii) changes in government (or public) transfers, and (iv) changes in the 
minimum wage.  Between 2001 and 2007, wage differentials between workers of different 
skills, living in different locations, and working in different sectors (formal/informal; 
primary/secondary) narrowed. Also during this period, public transfers rose (both in terms of 
average benefit and coverage), and the real minimum wage increased.  It is important to 
mention that the minimum wage has particular importance given the impact it has on 
retirement pensions.  
The paper estimates the order of magnitude of these factors’ contribution to the 
change in inequality by applying a non-parametric decomposition method. In this method the 
                                                 
19. The decline in income inequality in Brazil fulfills the Lorenz dominance test and is statistically significant at 
1 percent confidence level. During the period 2004–2007, however, the Lorenz curves cross so the fall in 
inequality is not unambiguous. The growth rate in income for the bottom 5 percent was below the overall 
average for all percentiles and less than half of the growth rate corresponding to the second quintile. (Barros et 
al., forthcoming).   13
actual Gini coefficients are compared with counterfactual ones generated by keeping some 
(depending on the question) proximate determinants of income inequality or income sources 
unchanged (Barros et al. 2006, 2007). The decomposition analysis is complemented by 
econometric evidence on the evolution of returns to education. The paper also compares the 
redistributive effectiveness of targeted transfers versus increases in the minimum wage. 
The authors decompose the changes in the Gini coefficient between 2000 and 2007 
into the four proximate determinants of income inequality: (i) changes in the proportion of 
adults in the household; (ii) changes in the distribution of household non-labor income per 
adult (which includes government monetary transfers); (iii) changes in the proportion of 
working adults; and (iv) changes in the distribution of labor income per working adult 
(average remuneration).  
Decomposition results show that most of the recent decline in income inequality was 
caused by changes in the distribution of household income per adult. Changes in the 
proportion of adults in the household were responsible for only eight percent of the overall 
reduction in income inequality. This is a reflection of the fact that the changes in dependency 
ratios were not disproportionately concentrated among the poor. Between 40 and 50 percent 
of the decline in income inequality – depending on the inequality measure – was due to 
changes in the distribution of non-labor income per adult; changes occurred both because 
inequality of non-labor income fell and the number of households receiving non-labor income 
rose. Changes in the distribution of labor income per adult can account for 31 to 46 percent of 
the decline in inequality, due to a significant growth in average labor income per adult and to 
a moderate decline in its inequality. The contribution of changes in the inequality of access to 
jobs was rather limited; workers from relatively poor households were not among those that 
benefited the most from job creation during 2001–2007. Essentially, there was a substantial 
reduction in both labor and non-labor income inequality among workers.   
The fall in labor income inequality was primarily due to the fall in inequality in the 
distribution of labor income per working adult. One factor that may explain this trend could 
be changes in access to education. The last decade was marked by an accelerated expansion 
of education in Brazil, more than twice as fast as the expansion that occurred in the 1980s. 
Since 2001 the standard deviation in years of schooling has started to fall: from 4.51 in 2001 
to 4.41 in 2007. Labor earnings differentials by education level have declined at all levels in 
Brazil, particularly for secondary and higher education.  
The decrease in the labor earnings differential by education level has been one of the 
factors contributing to the recent decline in inequality in Brazil. Based on the results of a   14
decomposition exercise, Barros et al. suggest that half of the decline in labor earnings 
inequality (and almost 30 percent of the decline in household per capita income inequality) 
was caused by the combined effect of a fall in the inequality of education and a fall in the 
returns to education. The latter—the price effect-- was the predominant factor, accounting for 
35 percent of the decline in labor earnings inequality (23 percent for household income), 
while the former—the quantity effect-- accounted for 11 percent of the decline in labor 
earnings inequality (3 percent for household income). The reduction in education inequality 
was the result of the large expansion in educational access that took place in Brazil over the 
last decade. Thus, the fall in returns is a result of a combination of supply-side and demand-
side factors.  
What accounts for the remaining half of the reduction in labor earnings inequality? 
Barros et al. argue that about 7 percent is accounted for by a decline in wage differentials 
between workers in metropolitan areas and those in medium-sized and small municipalities; 
urban workers versus rural, and primary versus other sectors
20. Spatial and sectoral labor 
market segmentation has been falling and this tendency has reduced income inequality. It is 
not yet clear which factors explain this trend. Perhaps there has been a relatively higher 
expansion of some productive sectors in the Brazilian ‘hinterland’ as opposed to the 
metropolitan areas thereby increasing the demand for labor and pushing up wages in the 
smaller and medium-sized municipalities compared to the past. There are a number of 
additional factors that could account for the unexplained 14 percent of wage inequality. These 
include changes in gender and ethnic discrimination and labor force participation rates, 
returns to other observable and unobservable characteristics, sectoral re-allocations of 
production, and rural–urban migration. 
As mentioned above, the decline in non-labor income inequality can account for as 
much as 50 percent of the decline in household income inequality. What are the determinants 
of the decline in non-labor income inequality? Barros et al. (2009) address this question by 
applying a non-parametric method, which decomposes the observed changes into the 
contribution of changes in individual sources of income by comparing actual with 
counterfactual Gini coefficients (Barros et al., 2006, 2007).  
The comparison of actual with counterfactual Gini coefficients for 2001 and 2007 
yields the following results. The contribution of changes in the distribution of income from 
                                                 
20. Care must be taken because there will be some double counting since education may increase inequality not 
just through the positive impact on productivity but also by channeling more educated workers to the better jobs 
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assets (rents, interest and dividends) and private transfers was unequalizing but limited. Most 
of the impact of non-labor income on the reduction of overall income inequality was due to 
changes in the distribution of public transfers: changes in size, coverage and distribution of 
public transfers explain 49 percent of the total decline in inequality.  
  Public transfers represent over 80 percent of non-labor income and 29 percent of 
household income
21 and include pensions and other standard contributory social security 
benefits; the Benefício de Prestação Continuada (BPC, a transfer to the elderly and disabled), 
and the Bolsa Família
22. The latter is Brazil’s conditional cash transfer program, which 
distributes cash to poor families on condition that the children and adolescents must attend 
school and meet basic health care requirements. The benefits paid by the program range from 
R$ 20 (Reais) to R$ 182. The program reaches 11 million families (more than 46 million 
people), a large proportion of the country’s 50 million individuals living in poverty. On 
average, the income of the poor is raised by around 12 percent
23. 
Since 2001, the government has increased the average amount of all transfers and 
broadened the coverage of well-targeted programs such as the Bolsa Família. The average 
amount transferred rose substantially for social security and BPC (55 and 21 percent, 
respectively) but less for Bolsa Família (13 percent)
24. Bolsa Família, on average, equals 5 
percent of average social security benefits. While contributory social security has the largest 
coverage – about 30 percent of the Brazilian population lives in households receiving 
contributory social security benefits – the largest expansion was in the Bolsa Família, whose 
coverage increased by close to 10 percentage points between 2001 and 2007, reaching 17 
percent of households. 
According to the decomposition results, while social security benefits account for 
almost 30 percent of the overall reduction in income inequality, the increasing coverage of 
non-contributory benefits (like BPC and Bolsa Família) was also important. Despite 
representing just a tiny fraction of total household income (0.5 percent each), changes in the 
BPC and Bolsa Família explain about 10 percent of the overall decline in income 
                                                 
21. This information is based on the surveys data. It does not include all government monetary transfers. The 
ratio is with respect to household income as reported in the survey and it is not necessarily equal to the ratio of 
all government transfers divided by household disposable income from the National Accounts. As we can see in 
the chapter on Mexico (Esquivel, et al., 2009) the transfers recorded in surveys may represent a small share of 
government monetary transfers.  
22. These two programs represent 1 percent of household income and 5 percent of the public transfers concept 
measured in the survey. 
23. Fiszbein and Schady (2009).  
24. The first two are indexed to the minimum wage while Bolsa Família is not.   16
inequality
25. In the case of social security transfers, the equalizing effect occurred primarily 
through an increase in the amount of the average benefit. In the case of Bolsa Família, the 
predominant factor was the increase in coverage and to a lesser extent the increase in the 
amount transferred.   
In sum, Barros et al. conclude that the recent decline in inequality in Brazil resulted 
from three main factors: (i) decreasing wage differentials by educational level and reductions 
in the inequality in education; (ii) increasing spatial and sectoral integration of labor markets, 
in particular among metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas; and (iii) increasing generosity 
of contributory and non-contributory government transfers. Raising the minimum wage must 
have played a role through (i) and (iii). In contrast to the episode of falling inequality in the 
late 1970s, demographic factors and the role of employment was not significant in either 
direction. Hence, changes in the dependency ratio among the poor, employment and 
unemployment were of little importance.  
Thus, the decline in income inequality in Brazil observed since 2001 may be 
attributed to the expansion of education, the changes in spatial patterns of labor demand and 
supply, and the larger size and increased progressivity of some public transfers, most 
importantly from social assistance (rather than social security). However, the wage gap 
between formal and informal workers continued to increase. In addition, as mentioned above, 
between 2004 and 2007, the incomes of the bottom 5 percent fell indicating that there might 
be flaws in the social assistance program design which deserve further scrutiny. 
 
Mexico 
After a period of rising inequality in the 1980s, Mexico’s income inequality has been 
falling for the past decade. (Figure 8) Between 1996 and 2006, Mexico’s Gini coefficient fell 
from 0.543 to 0.498 or by 0.8 percent per year and it declined by 1 percent per year between 
2000 and 2006
26. The incomes of the bottom 20 percent grew more than twice as fast as the 
incomes of the top ten percent between 1996 and 2006. Contrary to expectations, the faster 
growth of incomes at the bottom of the distribution happened during a period of lackluster 
aggregate economic growth. After the 1995 peso crisis, when GDP contracted by around 8 
percent, the economy quickly recovered. Between 1996 and 2000 Mexico’s per capita GDP 
                                                 
25. Note that this decomposition of inequality changes by income source is different from the prior 
decomposition by proximate factors so results cannot be combined. 
26. This Gini coefficient was estimated using total household income per capita which includes monetary and 
non-monetary sources (such as the imputed value for owner-occupied housing rent) and capital gains.   17
grew at a rate of 4 percent per year. However, between 2000 and 2006, growth slowed 
significantly; per capita GDP grew at only 1 percent per year. Mexico experienced a period of 
slow, pro-poor growth. 
The decline in inequality coincided with the implementation of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. It also coincided with a shift in government 
spending patterns. Since the early 1990s, public spending on education, health and nutrition 
has become more progressive. In 1997 the Mexican government launched the conditional 
cash transfer program Progresa (later called Oportunidades), a large-scale anti-poverty 
program which reached around five million poor households – around 14.8% of households 
in 2006. These changes made the post-fiscal income distribution (after taxes and transfers, 
including in-kind transfers
27) less unequal than before, re-enforcing the trend followed by 
income inequality shown above. 
Esquivel, et al.  (2009), analyze the proximate determinants of the decline in income 
inequality between 1994 and 2006. Using standard decomposition methods, the authors 
examine the roles played by changes in the distribution of labor income, demographics, and 
government transfers in the decline in inequality. The paper explores the influence on 
inequality of changes in the composition of the labor force by education and experience, and 
the relationship between this and changes in the patterns of public spending on education. 
Using standard benefits incidence analysis, the paper estimates the contribution of 
Progresa/Oportunidades to the observed decline in income inequality. Next, it analyzes the 
incidence of total public redistributive spending (including in-kind transfers) and taxes.  
As shown in Figure 8, the decline in income inequality is robust to different concepts 
of income. The results are also robust to the use of inequality measures other than the Gini 
coefficient. Labor income inequality tends to be higher than total income inequality. Finally, 
Figure 8 also demonstrates that remittances and transfers (both government and private 
transfers), which are important components of non-labor income, lower inequality and that 
their equalizing impact appears to have risen over time. 
Based on the decomposition method proposed by Barros et al. (2009), the change in 
income inequality is decomposed into changes in (i) the ratio of adults to total number of 
members in the household, (ii) the proportion of adults working to total number of adults in 
the household (iii) labor earnings per working adult, and (iv) household non-labor income 
                                                 
27. In-kind transfers mainly include government spending on education and health delivered to the population in 
the form of free or quasi-free transfers.   18
(which includes government transfers and remittances) per adult.
 28 The changes in all of 
these four proximate determinants were equalizing
29. The reduction in the inequality of labor 
income per working adult (labor earnings per worker from wages and from self-employment) 
was the most important contributor to the reduction in inequality in both 1996–2000 and 
2000–2006: it accounted for 87.1 percent of the decline in inequality in 1996–2000 and for 
65.5 percent of the decline in 2000–2006.  
The equalizing contribution of changes in the number of adults per household rose 
from 7.7 percent in 1996–2000 to 10.3 percent in 2000–2006. Also, the equalizing 
contribution of the proportion of working adults as a share of total adults (which measures 
both the supply-side decisions to participate in the labor market and the demand-side 
conditions of finding employment) rose by several percentage points in both 1996–2000 and 
2000–2006. However, despite their increase, the contribution of these two factors was smaller 
than that of changes in labor income (per working adult) and non-labor income (per adult) 
inequality particularly in the 2000–2006 period. The contribution of labor income to the 
decline in inequality increased sharply from 0.4 percent in 1996–2000 to 15.1 percent in 
2000–2006; the distribution of non-labor income per adult became the second most important 
contributor to the decline in inequality in 2000–2006.  
What has caused the distribution of labor income per working adult to change from 
being an unequalizing factor in 1994 to an equalizing one thereafter? Hours worked changed 
very little. In fact, they fell slightly for the bottom quintiles, an inequality-increasing change. 
Changes in relative hourly wages caused the distribution of labor income per working adult to 
change from unequalizing to equalizing. Starting in the mid-1990s, the gap between the 
wages of more educated workers and workers with little education (i.e. the skilled/unskilled 
wage gap) fell systematically. As shown in Bouillon et al. (2004), changes in the returns to 
education accounted for a significant share of the rise in household per capita income 
inequality between 1984 and 1994. During the 1994/96–2004 period the opposite appears to 
have occurred; returns to education was an equalizing factor. The distribution of the stock of 
education in the labor force became more equal too. The combined effect of a fall in the 
                                                 
28. In essence, the method consists of decomposing the change in an inequality measure into the contributions 
from changes in the distribution of the proximate determinants, taken one at a time, plus the contributions from 
changes in the interaction (correlation) of proximate determinants with each other. The contributions are 
estimated through a series of sequential counterfactual simulations that assume that the distribution of the 
proximate determinant of interest remains the same as in the base year. 
29. The changes in all the interactions between the proximate determinants combined were unequalizing in both 
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returns to education and the declines in inequality in educational attainment was a reduction 
in labor income (per worker) inequality. 
The paper does not address whether the fall in the skilled/unskilled wage gap was the 
result of demand-side or supply-side factors using a formal hypothesis-testing model. Several 
studies have looked at the demand-side factors emphasizing, among other things, the 
increasing integration of manufacturing production between the United States and Mexico, 
and its resulting increase in demand for low-skilled workers in Mexico. However, an 
examination of the changes in the composition of the labor force by education and experience 
and the corresponding relative wages suggests that supply-side factors must have been 
important too. Between 1996 and 2006 the reduction in wage inequality was caused by the 
fact that workers with lower levels of education and/or fewer years of experience had the 
largest increases in their average wages. These large increases seem to be correlated with a 
shift in the composition of labor supply by education and experience. The share of workers 
with less than lower secondary education (and more than 20 years of experience) declined 
from almost 55 percent of the workforce in 1989 to about one third by 2006. This reduction 
was offset by an increase in the shares of all the other groups of workers. These results 
suggest that the relative increase in the wages of low-skilled/low-experience workers must be 
associated with a reduction in the relative number of low-skilled workers. This result is not 
incompatible with the hypothesis of an increase in the demand for unskilled workers. Both 
supply-side and demand-side factors were at play. 
The reduction in the relative supply of workers with low levels of skills (measured by 
school attainment) might be associated with the increase in average years of schooling for the 
bottom two quintiles, which reduced schooling inequality considerably between 1994 and 
2006. In turn, the latter may be due to changes in public spending on education patterns in the 
1990s. Changes in public spending on education combined with the effects of the conditional 
cash transfer program Progresa/Oportunidades – which tied monetary transfers to keeping 
children of poor households in school and to receiving basic health services – significantly 
increased access to lower-secondary education by the poor.  
Public spending on education in the 1970s and 1980s was heavily biased towards 
higher education. This changed in the 1990s. The relative ratio of spending per student in 
tertiary versus primary education declined from a historical maximum of 12 in 1983–1988, to 
less than 6 in 1994–2000. By comparison, the average ratio for high-income OECD countries 
is close to 2. It is worth mentioning that the reduction in such ratio could be driven by a 
reduction in tertiary education spending, with no changes in primary or secondary education   20
expenditures, as actually happened in certain cases during the crisis of the 80s in the region. 
In this case, however, even though there was a reduction in tertiary education expenditures in 
real terms, there was a significant increase in resources devoted to primary and secondary 
levels. More resources on the supply-side and the implementation of demand-side subsidies 
for education through Progresa/Oportunidades, changed the incidence of public spending on 
education from being slightly regressive in 1992 to being progressive in 2006. Hence, the fall 
in skill premiums can be linked to both market factors, which affected the demand for labor 
by skill, and state action in education spending. 
Having established that changes in the distribution of non-labor income per adult 
played a significant role in accounting for the decline in income inequality, the paper 
analyzes the contribution to inequality dynamics of the main components of non-labor 
income. This is done using Stark et al.’s (1986) method to decompose the Gini coefficient by 
income source for 1994, 2000 and 2006. Non-labor income is a very heterogeneous concept. 
It includes incomes stemming from the ownership of capital (such as profits, interests and 
rents), private transfers (such as remittances), pensions (public and private), as well as 
targeted government transfers (such as the conditional cash transfer program 
Progresa/Oportunidades). The results show that a marginal increase in income from own 
businesses (profits), income from property (rents) and pensions would be unequalizing, 
whereas that from remittances, transfers and labor income (since 2000) would be equalizing.  
The equalizing contribution of transfers rose over time because their share in total 
income rose and their own inequality and Gini correlation with total monetary income fell. 
The share of transfers in total income rose because there was a significant expansion in 
coverage of public monetary transfers – in particular, through a subsidy program for 
agricultural production (Procampo) and Progresa/Oportunidades. Although Procampo had 
been expanding since its creation in 1994, the lion’s share of the expansion in households 
receiving non-labor income was due to implementation of the Progresa/Oportunidades 
conditional cash transfer program in 1997. In fact, Procampo is not a pro-poor transfer; in 
contrast, Progresa/Oportunidades is an example of ‘redistributive efficiency’.  
With as little as 0.36 percent of GDP and 4 percent of total redistributive spending, 
Progresa/Oportunidades accounts for 18 percent of the change in the post-transfers change in 
Gini coefficient. Unfortunately, the redistributive efficiency of this conditional cash transfer 
program is an exception among redistributive instruments currently operating in Mexico. 
Public spending had become more progressive between 1990 and 2006 and, according to 
Esquivel et al.(2009), government redistributive spending reduced the pre-fiscal Gini   21
coefficient by 9.3 percent in 2006 (if we exclude the impact of transfers in kind, the reduction 
in the Gini coefficient is 1.7 percent). But there is still a large share of government spending 
that is not redistributive. In 2006, around 58 percent of all the redistributive spending 
categories (monetary transfers, subsidies
30 and in-kind transfers) were regressive in absolute 
terms (that is, the poor received less than the rich in per capita terms), of which 11 percent 
was allocated to programs that made the pre-fiscal distribution of income more unequal. 
In sum, the decline in inequality in post-NAFTA Mexico can be explained by the 
equalizing price and quantity effects of education which decreased the relative supply of low-
skilled labor. The latter, in turn, reflect the large effort made by the government to expand 
basic education, including the launching of the conditional cash transfer program 
Progresa/Oportunidades.  A second important factor were the expansion of targeted 
programs to the poor. 
Peru 
Jaramillo and Saavedra (2009) focus their analysis on the dynamics of the fall in 
inequality during the post-structural reform period in Peru (1997–2006)
31. Before 
concentrating on the recent decline, the authors present an overview of inequality trends in 
previous decades and conclude that, although there are serious problems of data 
comparability, the evidence suggests an overall declining trend in inequality starting from the 
early 1960s. Based on the remarkable expansion of basic education and the equalizing 
redistribution of land that followed Peru’s land reform, the authors conclude that by the mid-
2000s the country was undoubtedly less unequal than four decades earlier. Jaramillo and 
Saavedra remind us, however, that despite the undeniable progress in reduction of inequality, 
the country’s measures of inequality remain high by international standards. In 2006, slightly 
more than half of total income was concentrated in the top quintile.  
Between 1997 and 2006, Peru’s Gini coefficient fell from 0.54 to 0.49, a change that was 
both statistically significant and satisfying Lorenz-dominance. The paper identifies the 
proximate determinants of this decline in inequality, and discusses the market and policy 
forces behind them. The decline in inequality appears to be associated with a fall in non-labor 
income inequality, since labor income inequality remained constant during this period
32 
                                                 
30. This category includes general subsidies to gasoline and other fuels, subsidies and monetary transfers to 
agricultural producers and the subsidized part of social security pensions. 
31. The authors refer to the period that followed the years of trade and investment liberalization and 
privatization that characterized Peru in the first half of the 1990s. 
32. When the two end points are compared; labor income inequality, however, rose between 1997 and 2001 and 
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(Figure 9). Non-labor income grew at a higher rate than labor income throughout the income 
distribution, but the difference was much greater for those households in the lower part, for 
which the relative importance of non-labor income was greater as well. Although it appears 
that changes in labor income inequality had little effect on overall inequality, some 
interesting trends occurred. In Peru, alike other countries in the region, the relative returns to 
education rose (the profile of returns became steeper) in the first half of the 1990s. By 
contrast, the skill premium in post-reform Peru fell. 
In order to analyze the factors that may account for the evolution of labor income 
inequality, Jaramillo and Saavedra apply a parametric decomposition analysis
33, which 
consists of simulating counterfactual distributions by changing one factor at a time and 
holding other aspects constant
34. Among its advantages, this methodology permits the 
identification of a factor’s contribution to inequality related to changes in either its 
distribution or its market returns. For example, it is possible to isolate the contribution of a 
change in the distribution of educational attainment (a proxy for human capital) from a 
change in the returns to education (e.g., the skill premium).  
Based on the results of the decomposition exercise, Jaramillo and Saavedra assess the 
contribution to income inequality of the following factors: educational structure of the labor 
force, returns to education, returns to residing in an urban area (versus a rural area), returns to 
a salaried job (versus self-employment), gender earnings gap, hours worked, and unobserved 
factors. The authors note that the decomposition exercise considers only the direct (partial 
equilibrium) effect of these factors on hourly earnings.  
The decomposition results suggest that change in the educational structure of the 
workforce (that is, the distribution of human capital) was equalizing. This can be traced back 
to the earlier expansion in coverage of basic education. Changes in returns to education had 
an equalizing effect at the individual worker’s level but were unequalizing at the household 
level. The decline in the returns to education appears to be the result of the combined effect 
of the increase in supply of workers with more years of schooling and the fact that demand 
for skilled workers did not outpace supply. In effect, the impact of skill-biased technical 
change petered out. The unequalizing effect of returns to education at the household level 
suggests that the pattern of assortative mating --better educated and better paid men marrying 
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34. This methodology differs from that used in the chapters on Brazil and Mexico in that the former simulates 
the entire distribution while the latter decomposes a specific indicator (the Gini, Theil, etc.).   23
better educated and better paid women-- became more pervasive, or that married and better 
educated women increased their participation in the labor force.  
The study demonstrated that returns to experience had an equalizing effect. The authors 
argue that this trend is likely to have been the result of both market and demographic factors. 
First, the introduction of new technologies brought a premium for operating knowledge – a 
skill more frequent among the youth – over experience. Second, because of the demographic 
transition, older workers represent a proportionately larger share of the labor force and thus 
their relative earnings fell. At the same time, returns to residing in urban areas had an 
unequalizing effect. However, since 2001, the change in returns to residing in urban areas 
was equalizing signaling a narrowing of the gap between urban and rural incomes. Changes 
in the gender earnings gap did not play a significant role in the changes in household income 
inequality. The returns to having a salaried job (versus self-employment) did play a 
significant, but opposite role in the two post-reform sub-periods, adding up to a negligible 
effect over the decade as a whole. In sum, a combination of market forces, public policies and 
demographics was behind the unchanged labor income inequality. 
  The decline in non-labor income inequality accounted for the decline in household per 
capita income inequality. Between 1997 and 2006, non-labor income rose for the entire 
income distribution, but it rose faster for the bottom of the distribution. The authors analyze 
this trend heuristically by examining the trends in government transfers.  
In Peru, social spending has been slightly biased in favor of the non-poor; on average, 
social spending on the poorest quintile corresponds to 92 percent of social spending on the 
richest quintile (whereas, for example,  the same figure is 233 percent in the United 
Kingdom). As a consequence of lower levels of overall spending as well as lower 
progressiveness, social spending on the poorest income quintile is slightly lower in Peru (9 
percent) than in a sample of Latin American countries, where it averages 9.9 percent. Overall, 
Peru does not excel in redistribution through the tax and transfers structure. On the tax side, 
revenue collection from personal income taxes has been very low and, on the transfer side, 
expenditures have not been progressive enough. 
Over the last decade, the state has increased its role in redistributing resources, albeit 
slowly. First, per capita social spending between 1997 and 2006 rose from US$ 150 to US$ 
206 per year. Second, the proportion of social spending directed to the poor also rose. 
Transfers to the poor increased in the form of non-monetary transfers
35 and public services, 
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and more recently, in the form of monetary transfers. Social spending incidence analysis for 
the period from 2002 to 2006 reveals that the share of non-monetary transfers in household 
per capita income rose by 0.8 percentage points on average. For the poorest income decile, 
the increase was equal to 6.5 percentage points; for the second, third and fourth poorest 
deciles, the respective increases equaled 5.5, 4.3 and 2.6 percentage points, respectively. 
Jaramillo and Saavedra state that changes in food transfers, in particular, accounted for the 
increase in the progressiveness of social spending. The authors conclude that more 
progressive transfers must be one key factor behind the reduction in household income 
inequality. 
While transfers became more pro-poor, the changes at the other end of the distribution 
reveal that there are some problems in allocation priorities. Between 2002 and 2006, the share 
of non-monetary transfers in per capita household income fell for the 8
th and 9
th deciles but 
rose for the 10
th (although by less than the average). This reveals that there is still room for 
improvement in the design of non-monetary transfers for redistributive purposes. 
State action also became more pro-poor in the area of access to basic infrastructure 
services. Here the Peruvian government has played an important role, either by directly 
providing access or by promoting private sector expansion into the poorer areas. Between 
1997 and 2006, the gap in access to electricity and sanitation services narrowed between the 
top and bottom 20 percent, as well as between rural and urban areas (although this did not 
happen with access to phone landlines). In fact, improvements have been the largest to 
sanitation services. Expansion in access to sanitation has been fast in both urban and rural 
areas. In urban areas the changes have been definitively pro-poor while in rural areas it has 
been only slightly pro-poor, as access has expanded significantly for all income groups.  
Despite this undeniable progress, gaps in access to basic services remain large. For 
example, while close to 100 percent of the highest-earning 20 percent in urban areas have 
access to electricity and sanitation, the access rate for the bottom 20 percent in rural areas is 
29 and 25 percent, respectively. The rural poor are still far below their urban counterparts, 
too; the access rate of the bottom 20 percent in urban areas is 89 percent for electricity and 73 
percent for sanitation. 
As mentioned earlier, changes in the structure of educational attainment of the labor force 
have played an equalizing role over the last decade. In effect, during this period, the share of 
workers with secondary school education increased. This expansion of the educational 
attainment of the labor force is the result of policies and household decisions over the last 
four decades. Between 1970 and 2000, school enrolment in basic education increased by 3   25
percent per year, a higher rate of growth than that of the population at normative schooling 
age, suggesting a catching-up process among children older than the normative age. 
However, while enrolment rose, spending per pupil fell and a long-term deterioration of the 
quality of education reduced its equalizing power. Peruvian public schools, which are 
attended by children of the poor, tend to be of lower quality than private schools. Adjusting 
for differences in quality, the authors note that “Peru’s education system is one of the most 
unequal in Latin America as measured by learning achievement on international tests.”
36  
In sum, the case of Peru demonstrates that market forces, government policies and 
demographic factors were at play in the decline in household per capita income inequality 
between 1997 and 2006. Public policies were important in equalizing the structure of 
educational attainment, making non-monetary transfers more pro-poor and expanding access 
to electricity and sanitation for the poor. Market forces kept returns to education in check 
and, together with demographic factors, decreased returns to experience. The equalization of 
educational attainment was due to the market-driven investment decisions of families, who 
saw the opportunity to improve their children’s prospects in life through education.  
However, as the authors conclude, the expansion of the educational system was not 
accompanied by an improvement in the quality of education. Moreover, there are indicators 
of a potential decline in average quality, while not only average levels, but the inequity in 
quality indicators may have also increased. Both facts are consistent with the long-term trend 
of stagnant productivity in earnings and high labor earnings inequality. Finally, the authors 
argue that the differences between rural and urban sectors remain large, despite 
improvements in rural economic conditions, and they are related to differences in public 
infrastructure and human capital, the reduction of which becomes a central public policy 
challenge.
37  
3.  Summary of the Main Findings 
The country studies for Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Peru address the following 
questions: what  is the  contribution  of demographic factors (changes in the proportion of 
adults in the household, for example) to the observed change in household per capita income 
inequality? Are changes in the distribution of labor income important? Are the changes in 
labor income driven by changes in the distribution of personal characteristics (in particular, in 
the distribution of educational attainment), changes in the returns to personal characteristics 
(returns to education, in particular) or changes in employment, hours worked or occupational 
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choice (wage labor vs. self-employed, for example)? If changes in all three are relevant, what 
caused them to change in turn? Was it increased coverage of basic education, the skill-mix of 
technological change, macroeconomic conditions or stronger labor unions? What has been 
the role of changes in the distribution of non-labor income? What determined those changes? 
Do changes in government transfers account for a significant part of the change in inequality 
in non-labor and overall income inequality? 
There are several patterns that recur throughout the four case studies and point to new 
dynamics  of  inequality  in  Latin  America.    First,  in  all  four  countries  changes  in  the 
distribution of the dependency ratio were equalizing.  The proportion of dependents fell more 
in poorer households but the contribution of this factor was relatively less important than the 
contribution of the reduction in labor earnings inequality
38 and non-labor income inequality. 
Also, the equalizing contribution of demographic changes was already underway in the 1990s 
reflecting the reduction in fertility rates that has characterized the region in the past two or 
three decades. It is not a new phenomenon. 
The two most important differences between the 2000s and the 1990s (and 1980s too, 
depending on the country) are the fall in both labor earnings inequality and non-labor income 
inequality. Declines in labor earnings inequality appear to be associated with less steeper 
returns to education functions, which reduced earnings per worker inequality, and much less 
so--or not at all--to changes in employment patterns. In contrast to the 1990s, the earnings 
gap between skilled and low-skilled workers fell. In Brazil, Mexico and Peru this seems to 
have been driven mainly by changes in the composition of labor supply. As a result of a 
significant increase in coverage of basic education (usually up to ninth grade)
39, low-skilled 
labor has become relatively scarce and therefore can command relatively higher wages. In 
Argentina, however, the reduction in this gap seems to be associated with several events: the 
post-2002 commodity boom, which increased total employment; the 2002 devaluation of the 
peso, which shifted demand in favor of sectors intensive in low-skilled labor; government 
mandated  wage  increases  (including  the  minimum  wage)  and  stronger  labor  unions.    In 
Argentina, a pro-union government keen in redistributing the windfall obtained from higher 
commodity prices together with the out-of-the-ordinary growth rates due to favorable terms 
of trade, seem to be the main factors explaining the decline in inequality. In Brazil, higher 
                                                 
38. In the case of Peru, the result is found for individual earnings but not at the household level indicating that 
assortative matching dampens the equalizing effect at the individual earnings level. 
39 Basic education goes from grades 1-9 in Argentina and Mexico; from 1-8 in Brazil; and, from 1-11 in Peru. 
The number of grades include what countries call as basic primary and secondary education.    27
minimum wages appeared to play a role as well. However, this was not the case in Mexico 
and Peru.  
In addition to the price effect of education, the educational upgrading of the labor 
force resulted in a more equal distribution of schooling attainment in the four countries and 
particularly in Brazil, Mexico and Peru. Thus, the quantity effect of education was also an 
equalizing factor. The significant increase in coverage in basic education, in turn, seems to be 
associated  with  conscious  government  efforts  (including  past  administrations).  Higher 
spending per student in basic education and an effort to make education accessible in rural 
areas eased supply-side constraints. In addition, the conditional cash transfer programs Bolsa 
Familia (Brazil) and Progresa/Oportunidades (Mexico) reduced demand-side constraints by 
compensating poor households for schooling costs and the opportunity cost of children’s 
labor.
40 
The reduction in labor earnings inequality—and of the skill premium in particular—
contrasts with what occurred in the previous decades. In the 1980s and, in particular, in the 
1990s returns to education rose. The evidence suggests this was caused by the opening up of 
the economies  to international trade and foreign investment and  the concomitant skilled-
biased technical change.  The reduction of the returns to education in the late 1990s and first 
half  of  this  decade  suggests  that  the  unequalizing  impact  of  the  skilled-biased  technical 
change  had  run  its  course.  Labor  market  dynamics  became  increasingly  affected  by  the 
structural changes in the composition of labor supply by skill (years of schooling). 
The reduction  in the inequality  of non-labor  income was the second major factor 
behind the fall in inequality. Non-labor income includes quite disparate income sources: (1) 
returns to physical and financial capital (interests, profits and rents), (2) private transfers (for 
example,  remittances)  and  (3)  public  transfers (monetary, and in  the case  of  Peru,  some 
transfers in kind). The contribution of changes in returns to physical and financial capital 
tended to be small and unequalizing.  In terms of private transfers, remittances proved to be 
equalizing and became even more so in the 2000s, because they closed the gap between rural 
and urban household per capita incomes. Remittances were particularly relevant in the case of 
Mexico.  However,  the  new  phenomenon  was  the  significant  rise  in  importance  of  the 
equalizing  contribution  of  public  transfers  in  the  2000s.  A  detailed  analysis  of  the 
contribution  of  programs  such  as  Bolsa  Familia  (Brazil)  and  Progresa/Oportunidades 
(Mexico) shows the remarkable redistributive power of well-targeted cash transfers to the 
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poor in reducing inequality (and, of course, poverty).  These programs are a small share of 
total  government  redistributive  spending  (and  GDP)  but  go  a  long  way  in  terms  of 
redistributing income to the bottom of the distribution. 
Finally, another trend that was present in the four countries analyzed here is that 
government spending on transfers (monetary and non-monetary) became more progressive in 
the 2000s. This trend went beyond targeted cash transfers. Spending on health, education, 
nutrition and basic infrastructure (electricity and water and sanitation, for example) became 
more progressive –that is, more pro-poor. In spite of the observed progress, however, a large 
share of public spending is still neutral or regressive from the distributive point of view. In 
addition,  taxes,  in  particular  personal  income  taxes,  are  severely  underutilized  as  an 
instrument of redistribution in a region characterized by having a substantial number of ultra-
high net worth (i.e. super rich) individuals.   
4.  Concluding remarks 
During most of the first decade of this century, income inequality in Latin America 
has declined, in some cases since the late 1990s. The Gini coefficient declined between 2000 
and 2006 in 12 of the 17 Latin American countries for which data are available. Our in depth 
analyses for Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Peru reveal that two main factors are found to 
account for much of the decline: a fall in the earnings gap between skilled and low-skilled 
workers and more progressive government transfers. In Brazil, Mexico and Peru, the fall in 
the skill premium seems to be associated with government efforts to expand the coverage of 
basic education which made educational attainment less unequal and made low-skilled labor 
relatively  less  abundant.  Thus,  through  both  quantity  and  price  effects,  the  expansion  of 
education  was  equalizing.  In  Argentina,  the  decline  in  inequality  is  associated  with 
government fiscal and labor policies which took advantage of the windfall in public revenues 
and overall growth generated by high commodity prices. Because the latter are known to be 
volatile, the government’s redistributive stance will be hard to sustain. 
Are the equalizing  forces through education  in Brazil, Mexico and Peru likely to 
continue? We know that the upgrading of the educational attainment of the labor force will 
face a tough barrier in terms of post-secondary education.  While educational attainment has 
become undoubtedly and significantly more equal, the same cannot be said regarding the 
distribution  of  the  quality  of  education.  The  poor  and  middle  ranges  of  the  distribution 
receive an education of significantly lower quality than the top ten percent, which usually 
attends better quality private schools. This reduces the probability of poor children—even if 
they completed secondary education—being able to access tertiary education, because they   29
cannot  compete  with  the  better  prepared  children  from  richer  households.    In  addition, 
compensating for poor children’s opportunity cost of attending the post-secondary level is 
more  expensive.  If  the  state  wants  to  continue  strengthening  the  path  of  equalizing 
opportunities through education as a way to equalize the distribution of income, addressing 
the inequality in quality levels of basic education and finding ways to compensate for the 
opportunity cost so poor children can attend tertiary education must take priority in the public 
policy agenda. 
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Figure 1 
Latin America: Evolution of the Gini Coefficient (early 1990s-mid 2000s) 
 
Source: Gasparini et al. (2008).  31
 
Figure 2 
Change in Gini Coefficient by Country: circa 2000-2006 in percent 
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Source: Authors’ calculation with data from SEDLAC (July, 2009), 
http://www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/sedlac/eng/. 
Notes:  
1. Data for Argentina and Uruguay is for urban areas only. In Uruguay, urban areas covered by the survey 
represent 80 percent of total population and in Argentina 66 percent.  
2. The average change in the Gini for each country is calculated as the percentage change between the end year 
and the initial year divided by the number of years; the average for the total is the simple average of the changes 
by country (12 countries in which inequality fell). 
3. The years used to estimate the percentage change are: Argentina (2006- 2000), Bolivia (2007- 2000), Brazil 
(2006- 2001), Chile (2006- 2000), Costa Rica (2007- 2000), Dominican Republic (2007- 2000), Ecuador (2007- 
2003), El Salvador (2005-  2000), Guatemala (2006-  2000), Honduras (2005- 2001), Mexico (2006- 2000), 
Nicaragua (2005- 2001), Panama (2006- 2001), Paraguay (2007- 2002), Peru (2007- 2001), Uruguay (2007- 
2000) and Venezuela (2006- 2000). 
4.  Using  the  bootstrap  method,  with  a  95  percent  significance  level,  the  changes  were  not  found  to  be 
statistically  significant  for  the  following  countries:  Guatemala,  Nicaragua  y  Venezuela  (are  represented 
horizontal lines in bars in the figure).   32
Figure 3 
























































































































































































Source: authors’ calculations based on data from SEDLAC (July, 2009). 
http://www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/sedlac/eng/. 
Notes:  
a. In order to make the differences in the Gini coefficients easier to compare, the vertical axis starts at 40 percent 
instead of zero. 
b. The years used to estimate the Gini coefficient are: Argentina (2006), Bolivia (2007), Brazil (2006), Chile 
(2006), Costa Rica (2007), Dominican Republic (2007), Ecuador (2007), El Salvador (2005), Guatemala (2006), 
Honduras (2005), Mexico (2006), Nicaragua (2005), Panama (2006), Paraguay (2007), Peru (2007), Uruguay 
(2007) and Venezuela (2006). The difference in the average for the region with Figure 1 is due to the fact that 
the latter uses the Gini coefficients for (circa) 2005 and here the numbers correspond to later years.   33
 
Figure 4 
Growth Incidence Curves by Decile and Percentile: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico (circa 
2000-2006) and Peru (1997-2006) 
 











































Source: Authors’ calculation. 
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Household per Capita Income and its Proximate Determinants 
 
 
Source: Barros et al. (2009). 
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Figure 6 
Argentina: Gini Coefficient (household per capita income) and GDP per capita: 1924-
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Source: Gasparini and Cruces (2009).   36
Figure 7 




























































Source: Barros et al. (2009).   37
Figure 8 


























Current Monetary Income (CMI) Labor Income
CMI w/o Transfers CMI w/o Remmitances
Current Total Income
 
Source: Esquivel, Lustig and Scott (2009). 
Note: Current income excludes income from sales of durables and capital gains.  
In the graph “w/o” means as without.  38
Figure 9 




Source: Jaramillo and Saavedra (2009). 
Note: Gini is for household total per capita income or expenditures and for labor income per worker in the 
case of labor income. 
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Table 1 
Economic and socio-demographic indicators: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Peru (circa 
2000–2006) 
 
2000 2006 2001 2006 2000 2006 2001 2006
GDP per capita * (a) 10292.2 11614.5 7936.5 8673.1 10966.2 11800.9 5591.9 6872.9
GDP per capita yearly growth rate: 
2006 - circa 2000 * (b)
GDP per capita yearly growth rate: 
2006 - circa 2003 * (b)
Average household per capita 
income from survey ** (c) 4228.7 4429.5 3713.2 4131.5 2389.0 2777.3 1862.3 2261.4
Population (in millions) * 36.9 39.1 176.7 189.3 98.0 104.2 26.0 27.6
Rural Population (in percent) *** (d) 9.9 8.6 18.8 15.8 25.3 23.7 29.3 28.9
Average household size ** 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.6 4.9 4.7 5.9 5.5
Adults per household ** (e ) 3.0 2.9 2.7 2.7 3.2 3.2 3.7 3.7
Working Adults per number of 
adults **
52.5 57.9 61.8 64.2 60.5 63.3 64.8 68.5
Open Unemployment rate ** (f) 14.8 9.5 9.3 8.4 2.2 3.3 5.0 4.2
Share of labor income ** 82.7 82.5 78.5 76.7 89.9 88.7 76.4 73.3
Labor force participation **
Total (f) 58.1 61.6 67.0 69.0 60.7 64.5 69.5 72.6
Female (f) 57.1 63.7 61.3 66.1 46.2 57.0 68.7 72.7
Male (f) 92.0 92.8 90.1 90.0 94.7 94.8 94.0 94.0











Gini ** (g) 50.4 48.2 58.8 54.8 52.9 49.9 52.4 49.3
Centile 90/10 ** (h) 11.9 11.2 15.7 12.5 11.4 8.9 11.7 10.6
Poverty (2.5 a day) ** (i) 14.2 11.0 27.4 19.5 21.9 13.9 29.9 20.4
Income share (j) 3.5 3.7 2.6 3.0 3.4 4.1 3.4 4.0
Average household size  (k) 5.4 5.4 4.8 4.5 5.6 5.0 6.4 6.0
Average years of schooling  (k) 7.1 7.7 3.4 4.2 3.9 5.1 4.1 4.4
Income share (j) 54.8 52.5 63.1 60.4 57.6 55.2 56.7 54.0
Average household size  (k) 2.8 2.7 3.2 2.9 3.6 3.6 4.7 4.1





Sources: Authors’ calculations with data from SEDLAC (Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEDLAS and the World Bank):
http://www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/sedlac/eng/index.php, World Development Indicators (WDI) database, World Bank: http://ddp-
ext.worldbank.org/ext/DDPQQ/member.do?method=getMembers and United Nations Population Division, The 2007 Revision: http://esa.un.org/unup.
3.5
Argentina (urban) Brazil  Mexico  Peru
Bottom quintile **
Top quintile ** 
7.8 2.7
1. (*) Data from WDI. The GDP data is from World Development Indicators (WDI) database, World Bank, July 2009. 
(f) Figures for Argentina in 2006 without Programa Jefes de Hogar (Head of Household Program) were equal to: 9.7 percent open uneployment rate; 
61.1, 63.0 and 92.8 percent for the total, female and male labor force participation, respectively.
(c) The average household per capita income was annualized multiplying by 12 the monthly per capita income. Household per capita income includes 
total labor and non-labor income (monetary and non monetary, includying imputed rent), is at PPP prices (constant 1993 international dollars).
(a) The GDP per capita is at PPP prices (constant 2005 international dollars).  
2. (**) Data from SEDLAC, July 2009. The household surveys used are Argentina (Urban) 2000: Encuesta Permanente de Hogares (EPH) and Argentina
(Urban) 2006: Encuesta Permanente de Hogares-Continua (EPH-C); Brazil 2001 and 2006: Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios (PNAD); Mexico
2000 and 2006: Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares (ENIGH); Peru 2001 and 2006: Encuesta Nacional de Hogares (ENAHO). All
values are in percent.
(e ) Adults were those individuals older than 15 years or head of household.
(b) The GDP per capita growth (annual %) was calculated based on the geometric growth rate between 2006 - 2000 and 2006 - 2003.
(d) Ratio of rural population was obtained between the years 2005 and 2000.
(g) Gini coefficient of household per capita income. There might be slight differences between the Gini coefficients presented here and those that 
appear in the papers included in this volume. These differences are due to the fact that some authors may have used the Gini coefficients that 
correspond to a different concept of income or were adjusted to make them comparable over time. These differences, however, do not affect the main 
results discussed here or in the individual papers.
(j) Bottom and top values are from household per capita income quintiles.
(k) Bottom and top values are from equivalized income quintiles.
(i) The international poverty line of $2.50 per day based on 2005 prices was used in the estimations of the headcount ratio (FGT(0)).
(h) Ratio of average income of centile 90 over average income of centile 10.
3. (***) Data from United Nations Population Division and WDI. 
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Table 2 
Decomposition of Inequality by Source: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Peru (circa 2000-
2006) 
 
ARGENTINA (urban areas): 2000-2006







Non-labor Income -0.68 26
Part. in Labor Market -0.43 17
Earnings per Worker -1.30 50
SUBTOTAL -2.61 100 91
Interactive Term (all) -0.26 9
TOTAL -2.87 100
BRAZIL: 2001-2006







Non-labor Income -1.61 45.2
Part. in Labor Market -0.15 4.1
Earnings per Worker -1.57 44.1
SUBTOTAL -3.56 100.0 120.8









Table 2 (continued) 
 
MEXICO: 2000-2006







Non-labor Income -0.73 15.1
Part. in Labor Market -0.44 9.1
Earnings per Worker -3.19 65.5
SUBTOTAL -4.87 100.0 158.3
Interactive Term (all) 1.79 -58.3
TOTAL -3.07 100.0
PERU: 1997-2006







Non-labor Income -2.29 94.4
Part. in Labor Market 0.08 -3.4
Earnings per Worker 1.21 -50.1
SUBTOTAL -2.42 100.0 59.5





Source: Alejo et al. (2009).   42
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